Risk Details

Risk factors are included on entity profiles in Sayari Graph to provide enhanced insight into risk type and severity. This page documents the different levels and types of risk in Sayari Graph.

Adverse Media Risk Factors

Bribery and Corruption (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_bribery_and_corruption
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to bribery and corruption.

Cybercrime (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_cybercrime
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to cybercrime.

Financial Crime (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_financial_crime
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to financial crime.

Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_forced_labor
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to forced labor and modern slavery.

Law Enforcement Action (from Adverse Media)

Key: law_enforcement_action
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced in relation to a law enforcement action.

Organized Crime (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_organized_crime
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to organized crime.

Other Reputational Risk (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_other
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to other reputational risk.

Terrorism (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_terrorism
Level: elevated
Category: adverse_media
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to terrorism.

Export Controls Risk Factors

Entity Displays Active License from Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB RF)

Key: entity_licensed_with_fsb_rf
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity displays an active license from the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB RF), which allows companies to work on projects classified as a state secret.

Entity Exports to Entity that Displays Active License from FSB RF

Key: exports_to_entity_licensed_with_fsb_rf
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity has possibly directly exported to an entity that displays an active license from the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB RF), which allows companies to work on projects classified as a state secret (1 hop away). Per FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), transactions with these companies is a potential red flag indicator of export control evasion in effort to procure EAR99 items. Consideration of this indicator, in conjunction with conducting appropriate risk-based customer and transactional due diligence, will assist in determining whether an identified activity may be connected to export control evasion.

Export Control Lists

Key: export_controls
Level: critical
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is subject to trade restrictions per the U.S. Consolidated Screening List, a list of parties for which the United States government maintains restrictions on certain exports, reexports, or transfers of items.

Exports Components in USA Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority Items List

Key: exports_bis_high_priority_items
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity has possibly directly or indirectly exported to Russia, Belarus, or Iran one or more shipments with Harmonized System (HS) codes corresponding to critical U.S. components that Russia relies on for its weapons systems (1-3 hops away). These HS codes are listed in Tiers 3.A, 3.B, 4.A, and 4.B of the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority List (CHPL). The BIS has developed the CHPL in collaboration with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Exports Critical Components in USA Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority Items List

Key: exports_bis_high_priority_items_critical_components
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity has possibly directly or indirectly exported to Russia, Belarus, or Iran one or more shipments with Harmonized System (HS) codes corresponding to critical U.S. components that Russia relies on for its weapons systems (1-3 hops away). These HS codes listed in Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority List (CHPL) are subject to the most comprehensive controls under the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 730 – 774) (EAR), meaning a license is required for items associated with these HS codes destined for these jurisdictions, including certain foreign-produced items. The BIS has developed the CHPL in collaboration with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Government Contractors in USA Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Military End User (MEU) Country

Key: meu_list_contractors
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity appears on a Chinese, Russian, and/or Venezuelan government list of entities authorized to procure and contract with that government. Because of their statuses as approved contractors for those governments, these entities may satisfy the criteria to be considered “military end users.” This designation represents an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to a “military end use” or “military end user” in the countries listed above.

Imports Components in USA Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority Items List

Key: imports_bis_high_priority_items
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity has imported one or more shipments with HS codes corresponding to critical U.S. components that Russia relies on for its weapons systems. These HS codes are listed in Tiers 3.A, 3.B, 4.A, and 4.B of the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority List (CHPL). The BIS has developed the CHPL in collaboration with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Imports Critical Components in USA Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority Items List

Key: imports_bis_high_priority_items_critical_components
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity has imported one or more shipments with HS codes corresponding to critical U.S. components that Russia relies on for its weapons systems. These HS codes listed in Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority List (CHPL) are subject to the most comprehensive controls under the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 730 – 774) (EAR), meaning a license is required for items associated with these HS codes destined for these jurisdictions, including certain foreign-produced items. The BIS has developed the CHPL in collaboration with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Listed on Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List

Key: cmic_entity
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is included on the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List, which targets companies that are part of China’s broader military-industrial complex but are not subject to the same sanctions as those on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. This list focuses on entities that directly or indirectly support or engage in activities related to the Chinese military, including the development and production of military technologies, dual-use items, or defense systems. While listed entities are not fully blocked from doing business with U.S. companies, specific export restrictions apply to sensitive technologies may apply.

Listed on USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Entity List

Key: export_controls_bis_entity
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is listed on the USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Entity List, which identifies foreign entities that pose risks to national security and foreign policy. Entities may be added for reasons such as involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorism, violating export laws, or committing human rights abuses. Exporters may require a license from BIS to transact with these entities.

Listed on USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Military End User List

Key: export_controls_bis_meu
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is listed on the BIS Military End User List, which identifies foreign entities that are designated as military end users. Entities may be added to this list for their involvement in military activities, potential use in military applications, or connections to foreign military organizations. Exporters may require a license from BIS to transact with these entities.

Listed on USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Unverified List

Key: export_controls_unverified_list
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s BIS Unverified List, which identifies foreign entities for which the BIS has been unable to verify their bona fides in relation to U.S. export regulations. Entities are added to this list when the BIS is unable to conduct on-site inspections or verify end-user information. Exporters may be subject to heightened scrutiny and may be prohibited from exporting sensitive items without a license from BIS.

Listed on USA Dept. of Defense National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2021 Section 1260H List

Key: export_controls_section_1260h
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is listed on the USA Dept. of Defense’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2021 - Section 1260H List, which identifies foreign companies and organizations with ties to the Chinese military or defense sector. This list was created to address national security risks posed by entities that support the Chinese military’s modernization efforts, including through the development of advanced technologies with potential military applications. Exporters may face heightened scrutiny.

Majority Owned by Military-Civil Fusion Entity

Key: military_civil_fusion_50_percent_rule
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity may be majority-owned by one or more entities that Sayari has identified as part of China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) program using a tagging methodology based on keywords in the company’s name, address, or business purpose.

Majority Owned by a Military End User (NDAA 1260H List)

Key: export_controls_section_1260h_50_percent_rule
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity may be majority-owned by one or more Military End User(s) listed on the USA Dept. of Defense National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2021 Section 1260H List. Majority ownership is determined by reviewing up to four levels of ownership, with a threshold of 50 percent aggregate ownership across these levels.

Majority-Owned by a Military End User (BIS Entity List)

Key: export_controls_bis_entity_50_percent_rule
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity may be majority-owned by one or more Military End User(s) listed on the USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Entity List. Majority ownership is determined by reviewing up to four levels of ownership, with a threshold of 50 percent aggregate ownership across these levels.

Majority-Owned by a Military End User (BIS Military End User List)

Key: export_controls_bis_meu_50_percent_rule
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity may be majority-owned by one or more Military End User(s) listed on the USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Military End User List. Majority ownership is determined by reviewing up to four levels of ownership, with a threshold of 50 percent aggregate ownership across these levels.

Majority-Owned by a Military End User (BIS Unverified List)

Key: export_controls_unverified_list_50_percent_rule
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity may be majority-owned by one or more Military End User(s) listed on the USA Dept. of Commerce BIS Unverified List. Majority ownership is determined by reviewing up to four levels of ownership, with a threshold of 50 percent aggregate ownership across these levels.

Majority-Owned by a Military End User (NS-CMIC List)

Key: cmic_entity_50_percent_rule
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity may be majority-owned by one or more Military End User(s) listed on the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List. Majority ownership is determined by reviewing up to four levels of ownership, with a threshold of 50 percent aggregate ownership across these levels.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Entity

Key: military_civil_fusion
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is a Chinese company possibly associated with China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) program based on keywords found in the company’s name, address, or business purpose. MCF is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) national strategy to develop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world class military” by 2049 through the elimination of barriers between China’s civilian and defense sectors.

Owned by Entity in Export Controls List

Key: owned_by_entity_in_export_controls
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity in an export controls list up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by Entity in USA Commerce BIS MEU List

Key: owned_by_bis_meu_entity
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity listed in the USA Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Military End User (MEU) List up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by Entity in USA NDAA Section 1260H List

Key: owned_by_section_1260h_entity
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity listed in the USA Department of Defense 1260H List up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by Listed on Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List

Key: owned_by_cmic_entity
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity listed in the USA Department of the Treasury Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Entity

Key: owned_by_military_civil_fusion
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by a Chinese company possibly associated with China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) program, based on keywords found in the company’s name, address, or business purpose, up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of Entity in Export Controls List

Key: owner_of_export_controls_entity
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) an export-controlled entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Entity Displays Active License from Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB RF)

Key: psa_entity_licensed_with_fsb_rf
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: psa

The entity is possibly the same as an entity that displays an active license from the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB RF), which allows companies to work on projects classified as a state secret. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Entity in Export Controls List

Key: psa_export_controls
Level: critical
Category: export_controls
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity subject to export controls. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Military-Civil Fusion Entity

Key: psa_military_civil_fusion
Level: high
Category: export_controls
Visibility: psa

The entity is possibly the same as an entity that is a Chinese company possibly associated with China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) program based on keywords found in the company’s name, address, or business purpose. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) USA BIS Boycott Requester List Entity

Key: psa_bis_boycott_requester_list
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: psa

The entity is possibly the same as an entity listed on the USA BIS Boycott Requester List as having made a boycott-related request in connection with a transaction in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States and has been reported to BIS as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Related to Export Controls

Key: export_controls_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from an entity subject to export controls. Applies to all relationship types that do not signify ownership.

USA BIS Boycott Requester List Entity

Key: bis_boycott_requester_list
Level: elevated
Category: export_controls
Visibility: seed

The entity is listed on the USA BIS Boycott Requester List as having made a boycott-related request in connection with a transaction in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States and has been reported to BIS as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR.

Forced Labor Risk Factors

Direct Trade History with ASPI Entity

Key: forced_labor_aspi_origin_direct
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity possibly traded directly with an entity mentioned in the following forced labor report: “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang” by Australian Strategic Policy Institute, that was identified in tier 1 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Direct Trade History with Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: forced_labor_sheffield_hallam_university_reports_origin_direct
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity possibly traded directly with an entity mentioned in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports that was identified in tier 1 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Direct Trade History with UFLPA Entity

Key: forced_labor_uflpa_origin_direct
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity possibly traded directly with an entity mentioned in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, that was identified in tier 1 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Direct Trade History with WRO Entity

Key: forced_labor_wro_origin_direct
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity possibly traded directly with an entity mentioned in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and Findings List that was identified in tier 1 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Direct Trade History with Xinjiang-Based Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_origin_direct
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity possibly traded directly with a Xinjiang-based entity that was identified in tier 1 of their supplier network using global import & export data. The Xinjiang-based entity was assessed with geospatial and/or keyword methodology as possibly located, registered, or conducting business in Xinjiang.

Entity from ASPI Forced Labor Report

Key: aspi_uyghur_forced_labor_report_entity
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity is named in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s report, “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang.” The ASPI has identified entities that are using Uyghur labour transferred from Xinjiang since 2017.

Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: sheffield_hallam_university_forced_labor_entity
Level: critical
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity is named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports for having reasonable evidence of the use of forced labor in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) through the manufacturing or production of goods.

Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Useful Resources

Key: sheffield_hallam_university_useful_resources
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

This entity appears in the “Companies Operating in the Uyghur Region” dataset published by Sheffield Hallam University. The dataset was collected from a human resources website in December 2021.

Entity with Chinese Prison Labor Keyword

Key: forced_labor_china_keywords
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The company name, address, or business purpose contains keywords that reference potential prison labor: “prison” or “laogai”. Applicable to China-based entities only.

Entity with Xinjiang Keyword

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_name
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The company name suggests the entity may conduct business in Xinjiang, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. Applied to entities derived from Chinese and trade data sources.

Entity with Xinjiang Operations

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_operations
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity has authorization to conduct operations and/or is involved in contracting activities in Xinjiang, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices.

Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (from Adverse Media)

Key: reputational_risk_forced_labor
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced for criminal activity related to forced labor and modern slavery.

Former WRO Entity

Key: former_wro_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity was formerly subject to trade restrictions per the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and Findings List, a list of parties for which the United States Government has reasonable evidence of the use of forced labor in the manufacturing or production of a good or goods entering the U.S. supply chain.

Intermediary Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: sheffield_hallam_university_forced_labor_reports_intermediary_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity is named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports for having reasonable evidence of serving as an intermediary manufacturer and/or downstream customer with one or more trading relationships with Chinese companies sourcing materials from the XUAR (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region).

Owned by ASPI Forced Labor Report Entity

Key: owned_by_aspi_forced_labor_entity
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity named in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s report, “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang,” up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: owned_by_sheffield_hallam_university_reports_forced_labor_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by UFLPA Entity

Key: owned_by_forced_labor_xinjiang_uflpa
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by an entity listed in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch.

Owned by WRO Entity

Key: owned_by_wro_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by a Withhold Release Orders (WRO) entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owned by Xinjiang-Based Entity

Key: owned_by_xinjiang_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by a Xinjiang-based entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of ASPI Forced Labor Report Entity

Key: owner_of_aspi_forced_labor_entity
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity possibly own (minority, majority, or wholly) an entity named in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s report, “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang,” up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: owner_of_sheffield_hallam_university_reports_forced_labor_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) an entity named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of UFLPA Entity

Key: owner_of_forced_labor_xinjiang_uflpa
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) an entity listed in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China”, also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch.

Owner of WRO Entity

Key: owner_of_wro_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) a Withhold Release Orders (WRO) entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of Xinjiang-Based Entity

Key: owner_of_forced_labor_xinjiang_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) a Xinjiang-based entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) ASPI Forced Labor Report Entity

Key: psa_forced_labor_aspi_uyghur
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity named in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s report, “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang.” The ASPI has identified entities that are using Uyghur labour transferred from Xinjiang since 2017.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Useful Resources

Key: psa_sheffield_hallam_university_useful_resources
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

This entity is possibly the same as an entity in the “Companies Operating in the Uyghur Region” dataset published by Sheffield Hallam University. The dataset was collected from a human resources website in December 2021. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Entity with Xinjiang Keyword

Key: psa_forced_labor_xinjiang_name
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity with a company name that suggests the entity may conduct business in Xinjiang, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Entity with Xinjiang Operations

Key: psa_forced_labor_xinjiang_operations
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity that has authorization to conduct operations and/or is involved in contracting activities in Xinjiang, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Intermediary Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: psa_sheffield_hallam_university_intermediary_entity
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

This entity is possibly the same as an entity named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports for having reasonable evidence of serving as an intermediary manufacturer and/or a downstream customer with trading relationships with one or more Chinese companies sourcing materials from the XUAR (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region). The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports Entity

Key: psa_sheffield_hallam_university_forced_labor_entity
Level: critical
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports for having reasonable evidence of the use of forced labor in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) through the manufacturing or production of goods. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) UFLPA Entity

Key: psa_forced_labor_xinjiang_uflpa
Level: critical
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity listed in the USA Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) WRO Entity

Key: psa_wro_entity
Level: critical
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity subject to trade restrictions per the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders and Findings List, a list of parties for which the United States Government has reasonable evidence of the use of forced labor in the manufacturing or production of a good or goods entering the U.S. supply chain.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Xinjiang Cotton Industry Entity

Key: psa_forced_labor_xinjiang_cotton_entity
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is possibly the same as an entity identified in e-commerce listings to be involved in the manufacture, trade, or storage of Xinjiang-produced cotton, a high priority sector for enforcement under the Strategy to Prevent Importation of Goods Mined, Produced or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Xinjiang-Geolocated Entity

Key: psa_forced_labor_xinjiang_geospatial
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity with geographic coordinates which indicate that the entity is based in Xinjiang, China, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) Xinjiang-Registered Entity

Key: psa_forced_labor_xinjiang_registration
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) an entity with a Uniform Social Credit Code (USCC) and/or registration number that indicates the entity is registered in Xinjiang, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Related to Entity from ASPI Forced Labor Report

Key: aspi_uyghur_forced_labor_report_entity_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from an entity named in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s report, “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang.” Applies to all relationship types.

Related to Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: sheffield_hallam_university_forced_labor_reports_entity_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from an entity named in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports. Applies to all relationship types.

Related to UFLPA Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_uflpa_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from an entity listed in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. Applies to all relationship types that do not signify ownership.

Related to WRO Entity

Key: wro_entity_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from an entity subject to trade restrictions per the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and Findings List. Applies to all relationship types.

Sub-Tier Trade History with ASPI Entity

Key: forced_labor_aspi_origin_subtier_product_blueprint
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity indirectly traded goods relevant to its supply chain with a third-party entity mentioned in the following forced labor report: “Uyghurs for Sale: ‘Re-education’, Forced Labor, and Surveillance beyond Xinjiang” by Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The risk was assessed using Sayari’s Product Blueprint, a proprietary methodology that traces downstream value chains to identify sub-tier supplier risks accurately across tier 2 & 3 suppliers using global import & export data.

Sub-Tier Trade History with Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: forced_labor_sheffield_hallam_university_reports_origin_subtier_product_blueprint
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity indirectly traded goods relevant to its supply chain with a third-party entity mentioned in Sheffield Hallam University’s Forced Labor Reports. The risk was assessed using Sayari’s Product Blueprint, a proprietary methodology that traces downstream value chains to identify sub-tier supplier risks accurately across tier 2 & 3 suppliers using global import & export data.

Sub-Tier Trade History with UFLPA Entity

Key: forced_labor_uflpa_origin_subtier_product_blueprint
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity indirectly traded goods relevant to its supply chain with a third-party entity mentioned in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. The risk was assessed using Sayari’s Product Blueprint, a proprietary methodology that traces downstream value chains to identify sub-tier supplier risks accurately across tier 2 & 3 suppliers using global import & export data.

Sub-Tier Trade History with WRO Entity

Key: forced_labor_wro_origin_subtier_product_blueprint
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity indirectly traded goods relevant to its supply chain with a third-party entity mentioned in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and Findings List. The risk was assessed using Sayari’s Product Blueprint, a proprietary methodology that traces downstream value chains to identify sub-tier supplier risks accurately across tier 2 & 3 suppliers using global import & export data.

Sub-Tier Trade History with Xinjiang-Based Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_origin_subtier_product_blueprint
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity indirectly traded goods relevant to its supply chain with a third-party Xinjiang-based entity. The risk was assessed using Sayari’s Product Blueprint, a proprietary methodology that traces downstream value chains to identify sub-tier supplier risks accurately across tier 2 & 3 suppliers using global import & export data. The Xinjiang-based entity was assessed with geospatial and/or keyword methodology as possibly located, registered, or conducting business in Xinjiang.

Supplier Network with ASPI Entity

Key: forced_labor_aspi_origin_subtier
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity has a third-party entity mentioned in the following forced labor report: “Uyghurs for Sale: ‘Re-education’, Forced Labor, and Surveillance beyond Xinjiang” by Australian Strategic Policy Institute, that was identified in tier 2 or 3 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Supplier Network with Entity from Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports

Key: forced_labor_sheffield_hallam_university_reports_origin_subtier
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity has a third-party entity mentioned in Sheffield Hallam University Forced Labor Reports that was identified in tier 2 or 3 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Supplier Network with UFLPA Entity

Key: forced_labor_uflpa_origin_subtier
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity has a third-party entity mentioned in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, that was identified in tier 2 or 3 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Supplier Network with WRO Entity

Key: forced_labor_wro_origin_subtier
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity has a third-party entity actively subject to trade restrictions per the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and Findings List that was identified in tier 2 or 3 of their supplier network using global import & export data.

Supplier Network with Xinjiang-Based Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_origin_subtier
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: network

Historical shipment records suggest that the entity has a third-party Xinjiang-based entity that was identified in tier 2 or 3 of their supplier network using global import & export data. The Xinjiang-based entity was assessed with geospatial and/or keyword methodology as possibly located, registered, or conducting business in Xinjiang.

UFLPA Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_uflpa
Level: critical
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity is listed in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China,” also known as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. Entities in the United States are prohibited from importing goods made wholly or in part with forced labor into the United States in an effort to end the systematic use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

WRO Entity

Key: wro_entity
Level: critical
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity is actively subject to trade restrictions per the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and Findings List, a list of parties for which the United States government has reasonable evidence of the use of forced labor in the manufacturing or production of a good or goods entering the U.S. supply chain.

Xinjiang Cotton Industry Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_cotton_entity
Level: elevated
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

E-commerce listings indicate that the entity is involved in the manufacture, trade, or storage of Xinjiang-produced cotton, a high priority sector for enforcement under the Strategy to Prevent Importation of Goods Mined, Produced or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China.

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Contractor

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_contractors
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity appears on a government list of entities authorized to procure and contract with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). The U.S. Department of the Treasury has designated the XPCC a paramilitary organization subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including forced labor.

Xinjiang-Geolocated Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_geospatial
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

Geographic coordinates indicate that the entity is based in Xinjiang, China, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. Excludes entities exclusively derived from trade data sources.

Xinjiang-Registered Entity

Key: forced_labor_xinjiang_registration
Level: high
Category: forced_labor
Visibility: seed

The entity has a Uniform Social Credit Code (USCC) and/or registration number that indicates the entity is registered in Xinjiang, China, a region designated as high risk for forced labor practices. Applicable to entities globally.

Political Exposure Risk Factors

Export to State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: export_to_soe
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: network

The entity exports to an entity that is a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE).

Former State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: former_soe
Level: elevated
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: seed

The entity was formerly a state-owned enterprise (SOE). According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a state-owned enterprise is defined as any corporate entity recognized by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership or control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership. Applicable to entities derived from risk intelligence data.

Owned by State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: owned_by_soe
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by a state-owned enterprise (SOE) up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: owner_of_soe
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) a state-owned enterprise (SOE) up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Politically Exposed Person (PEP)

Key: pep
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: seed

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), politically exposed persons (PEPs) are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions. Examples include heads of state or of government, senior politicians, senior government officials, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state-owned corporations, and important political party officials. Applicable to entities derived from Acuris Risk Intelligence and PEP, politician, and public servant data.

Possibly the Same as (PSA) State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: psa_state_owned
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) a state-owned enterprise (SOE). According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a state-owned enterprise is defined as any corporate entity recognized by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership or control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Possibly the Same as a Politically Exposed Person (PEP)

Key: psa_pep
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) one or multiple other entities that are Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs). The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Related to Politically Exposed Person (PEP)

Key: pep_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from a politically exposed person (PEP). Applies to all relationship types.

Related to State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: soe_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from a state-owned enterprise (SOE). Applies to all relationship types.

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)

Key: state_owned
Level: high
Category: political_exposure
Visibility: seed

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a state-owned enterprise is defined as any corporate entity recognized by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership or control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership. Applicable to entities derived from Acuris Risk Intelligence.

Regulatory Action Risk Factors

Law Enforcement Action (from Adverse Media)

Key: law_enforcement_action
Level: elevated
Category: regulatory_action
Visibility: seed

The entity has been mentioned by official government websites or mass media outlets as wanted, charged, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced in relation to a law enforcement action.

Owner of Entity Subject to Regulatory Action

Key: owner_of_regulatory_action_entity
Level: high
Category: regulatory_action
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) an entity that has been listed as subject to enforcement action by regulatory authorities, law enforcement/anti-corruption agencies, or other disciplinary bodies and is up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) an Entity Subject to Regulatory Action

Key: psa_regulatory_action
Level: high
Category: regulatory_action
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) one or multiple other entities that have been listed as subject to enforcement action by regulatory authorities, law enforcement/anti-corruption agencies, and other disciplinary bodies. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they are likely the same.

Regulatory Action

Key: regulatory_action
Level: high
Category: regulatory_action
Visibility: seed

The entity has been listed as subject to enforcement action by regulatory authorities, law enforcement/anti-corruption agencies, or other disciplinary bodies.

Relevant Risk Factors

Basel AML Index

Key: basel_aml
Level: relevant
Category: relevant
Visibility: seed

The Basel Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Index is an annual ranking that assesses the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing around the world and is maintained by the Basel Institute on Governance. The ranking displayed here ranks jurisdictions on a scale of 0 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk).

Corruption Perceptions Index

Key: cpi_score
Level: relevant
Category: relevant
Visibility: seed

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is published yearly by Transparency International and ranks 180 countries and territories around the world by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. The results are given on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). If the entity is referenced with multiple countries, the country with the highest score will be used.

EU High-Risk Third Countries

Key: eu_high_risk_third
Level: relevant
Category: relevant
Visibility: seed

This entity operates in a country identified by the European Commission as high risk due to strategic deficiencies in their regime related to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

Sanctions Risk Factors

Controlled by EU Sanctioned Entity

Key: controlled_by_eu_sanctioned
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

This entity may be controlled, directly or indirectly, by a sanctioned party designated via the EU Financial Sanctions List and/or the EU Sanctions Map List.

Controlled by OFAC SDN Entities

Key: controlled_by_ofac_sdn
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

This entity may be controlled, directly or indirectly, by a sanctioned party designated via the USA OFAC SDN List.

Controlled by UK Sanctioned Entity

Key: controlled_by_uk_sanctioned
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

This entity may be controlled, directly or indirectly, by a sanctioned party designated via the UK Consolidated Sanctions List.

EU Sanctioned Entity

Key: eu_sanctioned
Level: critical
Category: sanctions
Visibility: seed

Entities (persons, companies, or vessels) currently subject to trade, transport, immigration, or financial sanctions in the EU Financial Sanctions List and/or the EU Sanctions Map. The EU Financial Sanctions List and the EU Sanctions Map are published by the European Union (EU).

Export to Sanctioned Entity

Key: export_to_sanctioned
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity exports to an entity that is currently subject to trade, transport, immigration, and/or financial sanctions in one or several international sanctions lists.

Former Sanctions

Key: formerly_sanctioned
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: seed

The entity was formerly subject to trade, transport, immigration, or financial sanctions in international sanctions lists.

Majority Owned by EU Sanctioned Entity

Key: eu_50_percent_rule
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly majority owned by one or more entities currently subject to trade, transport, immigration, or financial sanctions in the EU Financial Sanctions List and/or the EU Sanctions Map up to 4 hops away with an aggregate of 50% or more controlling interest (per EU’s 50% rule) via direct shareholding relationships. These relationships include shareholder or subsidiary. Applicable to entities globally.

Majority Owned by OFAC SDN

Key: ofac_50_percent_rule
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly majority owned by one or more entities currently subject to trade, transport, immigration, or financial sanctions in the USA OFAC SDN Sanctions List up to 4 hops away with an aggregate of 50% or more controlling interest (per OFAC’s 50% rule) via direct shareholding relationships. These relationships include shareholder or subsidiary. Applicable to entities globally.

Majority Owned by UK Sanctioned Entity

Key: uk_50_percent_rule
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly majority owned by one or more entities currently subject to sanctions in the UK Sanctions List up to 4 hops away with an aggregate of more than 50% controlling interest via direct shareholding relationships. These relationships include shareholder or subsidiary. Applicable to entities globally.

Minority Owned by EU Sanctioned Entity

Key: eu_minority_ownership
Level: elevated
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

This entity may be minority-owned by a sanctioned party designated via the EU Financial Sanctions List and/or the EU Sanctions Map List.

Minority Owned by OFAC SDN

Key: ofac_minority_ownership
Level: elevated
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

This entity may be minority-owned by a sanctioned party designated via the USA OFAC SDN List.

Minority Owned byUK Sanctioned Entity

Key: uk_minority_ownership
Level: elevated
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

This entity may be minority-owned by a sanctioned party designated via the UK Consolidated Sanctions List.

OFAC SDN Entities

Key: ofac_sdn
Level: critical
Category: sanctions
Visibility: seed

Entities (persons, companies, aircraft, or vessels) currently subject to trade, transport, immigration, or financial sanctions in the USA OFAC SDN Sanctions List. The SDN, or Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, List is published by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Owned by Sanctioned Entity

Key: owned_by_sanctioned_entity
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity is possibly owned (minority, majority, or wholly) by a sanctioned entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Owner of Sanctioned Entity

Key: owner_of_sanctioned_entity
Level: high
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity possibly owns (minority, majority, or wholly) a sanctioned entity up to 3 hops away via direct shareholding relationships with 10% or more controlling interest, including beneficial owner, owner, shareholder, partner, subsidiary, or branch. Applicable to entities globally.

Possibly the Same As (PSA) a Sanctioned Entity

Key: psa_sanctioned
Level: critical
Category: sanctions
Visibility: psa

The entity is Possibly the Same As (PSA) one or multiple other entities that are Sanctioned. The entities did not meet the threshold required to merge them into a single entity, but they may be the same.

Related to Sanctioned

Key: sanctioned_adjacent
Level: elevated
Category: sanctions
Visibility: network

The entity is 1 hop away from an entity subject to trade, transport, immigration and/or financial sanctions in one or several international sanctions lists. Applies to all relationship types.

Sanctioned

Key: sanctioned
Level: critical
Category: sanctions
Visibility: seed

Entities (persons, companies, aircraft, or vessels) currently subject to trade, transport, immigration, or financial sanctions in international sanctions lists.

UK Sanctioned Entity

Key: uk_sanctioned
Level: critical
Category: sanctions
Visibility: seed

The entity (person or company) is currently subject to financial sanctions in the UK Sanctions List. The UK Sanctions List is published by the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).